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Abstract 
The traditional distinction between profit and non profit firms does not necessarily apply to some types of co-
operative firms, such as the Italian mutual cooperative banks (MCBs). These MCBs present a peculiar 
governance structure, a combination between a public company governance model and a non-profit one. 
Similarly to a “not for profit organization”, the ownership of the MCBs is widely diffused among borrower-
owners, but dividends are not typically redistributed. Like in “public company bank”, MCBs have a spread 
ownership and a board of directors. MCBs work in order to maximise social utility rather than profits, as a social 
entrepreneurship.  
MCBs represent a kind of third way governance model in the financial sector. The board of directors of a MCB 
acts as a public-good administrator in deciding on how to invest, with a deep impact on the local community. 
However, the governance of these banks is affected by structural problems. The mutual and co-operative nature 
of these banks is challenged by the increase in the number of members-owners and in the heterogeneity of the 
member-owners group.  
This study aims at investigating the democratic voting mechanism of the board (one-head one-vote) and its 
appropriateness given enlargement of the member’s community. The research would tackle the issue of 
governance structure and incentive to efficient behavior.  
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Introduction 
The traditional distinction between profit and non profit firms does not necessarily 
apply to some types of cooperative firms, such as the Italian mutual cooperative 
banks (MCBs). These MCBs present a peculiar governance structure, with elements 
of the social enterprises and features of not for profit firms. Similarly to a “not for 
profit organization”, the ownership of the MCBs is widely diffused among 
borrower-owners, but dividends are not typically redistributed. Like in “public 
company bank”, MCBs have a spread ownership and a board of directors in charge 
of writing the agenda for the management’s activities. MCBs work in order to raise 
deposits, as a normal bank, but they maximise social utility rather than profits, as a 
social entrepreneurship.  
MCBs may be considered as a third way governance model in the financial 
sector. The board of directors of a MCB acts as a public-good administrator in 
deciding on how to invest the mutual fund. These decisions have relevant impact 
not only on the member’s community but also on the local community as a whole. 
Especially in rural environment, where the MCB is in same case the only financial 
institution in the municipality, the board of directors of MCBs plays a strategic role 
for the development of the area. MCBs underwent, in the last 15 years, a phase of 
regulatory change due also to the fact that the entire Italian Banking sector was 
transformed and liberalized.   
With the enlargement of their business, the governance of these banks could 
be affected by structural problems. In the governance bodies of the MCBs are 
represented different group of members. The mutual and co-operative nature of 
these banks could be challenged by the increase in the number of members-owners 
and in the heterogeneity of the member-owners group. While in small cooperative 
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the peer monitoring of the members is sufficient to avoid abuses form the top 
managers, the increasing dispersion of the ownership of these bank might create 
problems of lack of monitoring of management behavior.   
In this study we intend to investigate the governance features of the MCBs. In 
particular we will argue that the democratic voting mechanism of the board through 
the one-head one-vote system may be efficient when applied to a small cooperative 
but could produce problems in a large cooperative with thousands of members. The 
final result will show how the ownership structure of MCBs seems to be an 
appropriate answer to these challenges. 
A large cooperative could show some features which are similar to those of a 
capitalist public company: ownership widely dispersed, rapid size growth, 
separation between ownership and control. The ‘one-head one-vote’ system is a 
strong obstacle to a hostile takeover, that could have play an important role in case 
of poorly management.  
Moreover, the board of these cooperative banks is often composed by 
volunteers elected from the general assembly with little specific knowledge relating 
to financial or management problems, so there may be a problem of lack of human 
capital skill in the management of these banks.  
The voting rule does not specify a weighted representation in the board for 
different categories of members, so the board could be biased by more powerful 
economic groups. Given the public good nature of the funds that MCBs re-invest in 
the community, and taking into account the weak incentive that members have in 
large cooperative to monitor management, private benefit from control or free riding 
behavior can be exercised by directors.  
The membership structure, on the contrary, allows each single member to 
remove the board in case of miss-management by voting against the balance sheet. 
This threat is very powerful because there is no possibility for a major shareholder to 
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collude with the board and approve the balance sheet without the support of the 
assembly. In case of increase in net profits that can create private benefits for the 
board, the members will press the manager for a improvement of the interest rate 
condition both of lenders and borrowers. The separation between ownership and 
control is guarantee through the two tier management structure.     
Cooperative banks are very important actors in the Italian banking sector 
because they have very strong roots in local territories, they have long term relations 
with local firms and families and show information advantages with respect to large 
national commercial banks. The governance structure is, most of the time, a feature 
that creates additional value to the bank behavior, but over the last 15 years the 
banking sector has experienced a deep change due to a deregulation and to new 
rules. In this new scenario, many cooperative banks could have lost their mutual 
mission and have adopted more ‘capitalistic’ characteristics. The worry is about the 
adequacy of the governance structure at the increased size of the MCBs.  
The paper is organized as follows: the first section describes the role played by 
mutual credit cooperative in the Italian banking sector; section two puts the 
cooperative movement into an historical perspective; section three deals with the 
governance model of the cooperative firms; section four analyzes the mutual banks 
in terms of the social enterprise approach and presents the key feature of their 
governance model; in the fifth section, the problems of consistency and 
inconsistency of the traditional rules of cooperative banks are evaluated.  
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1. Mutual cooperative banks and the recent evolution of Italian 
banking sector  
The Italian banking industry is divided into three main bank typologies 
characterised by different kinds of stakeholders: Commercial Banks2, with investor-
owners, Banche Popolari and Mutual Co-operative banks3 (MCBs), with borrower-
owners. Differently from Banche Popolari, the shareholders of MCBs do not receive 
dividends. In the early 1990s a process of de-regulation reform changed deeply the 
Italian banking industry. The new Banking Law of 1992 represented a turning point, 
especially for MCBs. Thanks to the liberalization, the membership enrollment in 
MCBs was much more deregulated, geographical restriction to banking activities 
was abolished; lending maturity specialization was also abolished so that universal 
banking became the new standard, and a vast program of privatization was also 
started.  
After deregulation, a mergers wave4 has been the cause for the reduction in 
the number of credit institutes (see Figure 1). The process has significantly reduced 
its importance in the most recent years. The reduction of MCBs due to this structural 
process has been in part smoothed by the opening of new banks. The MCBs 
represent the 50% of the overall number of new banks from 1990 to 2000. In general, 
the establishment of new banks has been more concentrated in the South (59.5%), 
followed by the North area (24.1%) (Maggiolini and Mistrulli, 2001).  
                                                 
2 Saving banks could be included in the category because they change their ownership structure from 
a common ownership to a private one.   
3 Given their co-operative aim, in the literature co-operative banks are included in the not-for profit 
banks.  
4 As Gutiérrez (2008: 4) points out, “the 2003 special Fitch report on Italian co-operative banks 
indicates that mergers between co-operative banks were in many cases the result of weaker, troubled 
banks being acquired by a stronger co-operative bank”. 
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At the end of 2009 the Italian co-operative bank system included 421 banks 
with 4,122 branches. The reduction in the number of banks has been balanced by a 
denser branches network that increases of the 83% from 1994 to 2008. MCBs are 
settled in 2,647 Italian municipalities; in 549 municipalities the local co-operative 
bank is the only financial institution (Federcasse, 2009). Most of the MCBs and their 
branches have been established in the north-east (43% of the total number), with a 
density 1.6 branch per 10.000 inhabitants (see Figure 2 and 3). The members/clients 
ratio is around 17% while the share of member on the overall Italian population is 
1.65%.  
The size of cooperative banks has increased: in 1999 cooperative banks 
numbered on average 5 branches with 42 employees; in 2009 these figures have 
increased until 10 branches with 73 employees per bank, 7 per branch. The increase  
size could be explain by the process of merger and acquisition that followed the 
liberalization and has allowed cooperative banks to extend their services to larger 
customers (Azzi, 2009: 15).   
Cooperative banks have improved their overall performance and have not, as 
someone feared, been squeezed out by commercial banks. Their total direct funding 
accounts for 144.8 billion of Euro with an increase of 10.7 % compared to 2008. The 
assets are around €19.2 billion which correspond to the 6.33% of the overall banking 
industry assets. The change in the assets has followed the general industry trend, 
whit a decrease in the growth rate in 2008. The main assets of MCBs are represented 
by the direct funding given to clients and members, which accounts for 70.6% versus 
the 50.4% of the remaining banking industry, as showed in Table 1. Differently from 
the other banks, the tangible assets have a larger share for MCBs, while the inter-
banking founding provision is less important.  
Between 1999 and 2009, the funding provision of cooperative banks increased 
by 214 per cent; twice the rate of the rest of the banking industry (Figure 4). 
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Nevertheless, cooperative banks constitute about 8 per cent of total credit provision 
in the Italian banking system. Even if this value is increasing (in 2006 MCBs 
accounted for less than 7%) this level is still lower than in Germany and in Austria. 
The liabilities composition of MCBs has a peculiar characteristic: in 2008 the larger 
share of liabilities, almost 40%, comes from the deposits of clients and members 
while the share of the banking industry accounts only for 22% (see Figure 5 and 6). 
MCBs show a higher level of assets compared to the risky activities. The solvency 
ratio is almost double the official threshold requirement.  
As for most European countries, the main influence of Italian cooperative 
banks cannot be identified in their overall market share, but rather in their specific 
objectives and services. The cooperative banks’ knowledge of the local community 
gives them a competitive advantage in assessing and properly handling SME loans. 
It enables them to propose loan products that are adapted to the needs of their SME 
customers, including advice on available public support programmes (EACB, 2006). 
In 2009 loans given to small and medium firms go beyond the threshold of 20%. 
Counting together SMEs and productive households, their share is of 37.74%. 
In conclusion, MCBs, after the liberalization has experienced a period of great 
growth, increasing their market shares in the overall banking platform and, in 
particular, in same specific segments such as SMEs lending.  
2. The cooperative sector in Italy in historical perspective 
The cooperative movement in Italy has emerged in the second half XIX century as an 
offshoot of the Society of Mutual Aid. Since its birth, cooperatives have been 
characterized by either a political or religious orientation.  
 The first cooperative wave was mainly inspired by the liberal thought, with 
strong influence by Giuseppe Mazzini (Zamagni, 2006). The cooperative form was 
used to organize consumer’s and producer’s group. Parallel to them a new form of 
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retail bank emerged. The credit cooperatives were more overspread and deeply 
developed at the end of the 1870s.  
A second generation of cooperatives emerged in the last decades of the XIX 
century, most linked with the development of socialism and communism. The new 
cooperatives made the North of Italy one of the most dynamic region from a 
productive point of view. In particular, to react to the agrarian crisis of the 1882-83, 
farmers from the Padana Valley organized themselves into groups of socialist 
inspiration. In this frame the first Mutual Cooperative Bank was fund in rural 
Loreggia close to Padua by Leo Wollemborg on June, 20 1883.  
A third group of cooperatives was born to support the interests of Catholics 
engagement in social issues, after the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII Rerum Novarum of 
1892 aimed to take concrete initiatives to stimulate economic development of rural 
inhabitants and urban proletariat (Zamagni, 2006). Starting from this document, 
many cooperative rural banks (Casse Rurali) were founded and quickly spread in 
several Italian regions. 
The foundation of cooperative banks was supported by the Italian Federation 
of Rural Banks, coordination body founded in 1905 to promote the formation of 
catholic banks. The creation of a network, based on the two levels –i.e. cooperatives 
and the federation body - helps the coordination vertically (sector) and horizontally 
(spatial). This system enhanced the strengthening of the supply chains in order to 
increase their productivity and competitiveness of the banks.  
Before World War I, Italy had a cooperative group every 4791 inhabitants, 
almost one per municipality. However, Italian cooperatives were affected by a 
quality problem, due to their poor assets and the actual volume of their business. 
Piedmont owned the 43% of the total national cooperative assets, while the 
cooperatives in Lombardy showed the highest level of business volume.  
 9 
The structural limits of the cooperative credit sector become more evident in 
the post-war because of the economic crisis, the inflation, the growth of the 
unemployment and the weakening of the liberal government. The internal division 
emerged and the new political party, the Fascist National Party, looked at 
cooperatives as a good way to control and influence the working class (Zamagni, 
2006). 
After the closure of the second level cooperative institutions, Fascism started 
its own cooperative movement, with the establishment in 1926 of the Ente per la 
Cooperazione Fascista (Fascist Cooperation Institute). The fascist regime used the 
cooperative overspread influence as a tool for control and propaganda by entrusting 
the management of cooperatives representatives of the Fascist Party, not always 
qualified to manage them efficiently.  
The cooperative movement were reduced in importance. The Bank Law 
passed in 1926 put the credit institutes under the supervision of the Bank of Italy. In 
the same year, the first central financial institution was settled and immediately 
hampered in its functions by the Agricultural ministry. Finally, the economics 
shortages faced by farmers before and after the financial crisis of 1929 have reduced 
the assets of the rural banks. From 1925 till the end of the second war the number of 
the rural banks reduced of the 66%5.  
In 1932 and in 1934 two regulation acts for rural credit banks were approved 
by the government. First, it regulated the entry of new members at category of 
workers different from farmers; secondly, it restricted the credit activity for rural 
banks only at the agricultural industry. This constrain was immediately relaxed, and 
in 1936 the new Banking Law extended the activities also at the artisans of the local 
                                                 
5
 In this frame some peculiar case emerged: in Sicily, where the rural banks were the backbone of the 
regional cooperative movement, their number reduced to 194 with a 50% of them in liquidation 
(Fornasari and Zamagni, 1997). 
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community. The main target for cooperative banks became the local community, but 
they should guarantee their preferential activity to members.  
The new Civil Code passed in 1942 stabled price rules about the 
establishment of a cooperative, the value of the shares each member could hold 
while it did not specify the concept of mutuality necessaries to distinguish 
cooperative from other forms of firm.   
The Italian constitution entered into force on 1 January 1948 recognized the 
importance of this industry in art. 45 and started a series of laws to regulate both its 
administrative and fiscal aspects.  
The first law on cooperation, the “Basevi Act”, has been approved in 1947. 
The following year he launched the Consolidated Law on CRA (Casse Rurali e 
Artigiane) - Rural and Handicraft Banks- which are defined as cooperative societies 
with the primary purpose "the provision of credit to farmers and to artisans, jointly 
and severally". The internal democracy was guaranteed through some rules such as 
the “one head one vote” rule, the limitations on the shares owned by each members, 
the “opened door” rule for which it is not possible to negate the membership to 
those who answered to the enroll requirements without any valid reasons, and the 
prohibition of selling shares without the permission of the directors. The association 
should guarantee: (i) the prohibition to redistributes dividends above the legal 
limitations, (ii) the prohibitions of redistributing the reserves while the cooperative 
is alive, and (iii) the devolution of the social assets for some public utility goals at the 
end of the cooperative life. Finally, the law disposed the supervision requirements 
that in the case of credit cooperative banks were entrusted to the Treasure (Zamagni, 
2006).  
After the Besavi law, a long period of legislative silence started with two 
main exceptions: the regional law in Trentino Alto Adige in 1954 inspired by the 
Austrian tradition and the law on rural banks the following year. This last, while it 
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maintained the principal rules6, it introduced some innovative aspect, such as the 
divisions of the profits half of which should have be given as ordinary reserve, half 
redistributed to members with the limits of the 5%.  
In 1992, the Banking Law has directly affected cooperative banks. Rural and 
Handicraft banks ware transformed in Mutual Cooperative Banks (MCBs) allowed 
not only to offer all the services and products of other banks, but also to become a 
partner for anyone operating in the territory. In order to strength mutuality, it was 
established that 3% of the yearly profits would have been address to the promotion 
and development of the cooperation. Cooperative banks should have devolved 3% 
of their annual net profits to the cooperative credit common fund. 
The cooperative movement developed consistently from 1990. The employees 
increased of the 60.1%, ¼ of the overall national employment (Zamagni, 2006). 
Cooperatives enlarged their dimensions. The cooperative movement has been an 
emergent strength of the Italian entrepreneurship. In most recent years the 
cooperative movement enforced its role in the Italian economy thanks to a process of 
consolidation (Tables 4 and 5). 
MCBs have been an integrant part of the cooperative movement. The strict 
linkages with cooperative firm in terms of credit have been deep especially in the 
most recent period of eradication.  
3. The cooperative model of enterprise  
The cooperative form is used in many industries: it could be imply in the  
production as if in the service industry. The origin of cooperatives is traditionally 
explained in terms of social, political or historical factors. Cooperative enterprises 
                                                 
6
 For example, the maximum of 1/5 for the non farmers and non artisans, the mutualistic elements of 
the banks with services preferentially deliver to members. 
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are often considered as organization model alternative to traditional capitalist firms 
and as a way to spread risk among several people.  
But using the property right approach, one can say that cooperatives are in 
some cases an efficient solution for allocating control to two or more individuals 
even if it could not be consider a system to collect dispersed financial resources7 to 
provide capital for large enterprises. 
In general, one feature that may distinguish a cooperative from a capitalist 
firm is that the owners of a cooperative have also other kind of interests at stake in 
the firm: they are employees or consumers of the products of the firm.       
The cooperative model may characterize organizations that have very 
different objectives, in some cases they are closer to not for profit organizations 
producing public or quasi-public goods, but in most of the cases they are firms 
operating in competitive markets.  
In general, there are consumers’ cooperatives which provide goods to 
members and sometimes also to the all consumers; producers’ cooperatives that are 
association of workers who share the production means and share the monetary 
return. There are also credit cooperatives that lend money to their members who 
invest their savings in the credit coop itself. 
In 1864 Léon Walras started a credit cooperative (Caisse d’escompte des 
association populaires de credit, de production et de consummation, Société à responsabilité 
limitée) together with L. Say and J. Simon. Walras thought that cooperative firms 
were a model somewhere between state-ownership and capitalist firms. Walras 
(1865) maintained that workers in a cooperative firm were also owners and so had 
additional incentives as compared to workers in a traditional capitalist firm; but 
                                                 
7
 Considering the case of MCB, the price paid to become a member, that could be consider as the price to 
acquire a share of the bank, is fixed by law and it could not be more than 500€. Given the “one - head one -
vote” rule, members have no incentives to own more shares. The capital collected is then quite low. 
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cooperative firms should also be viewed as a system to collect dispersed financial 
resources and to establish new enterprises. 
Maffeo Pantaleoni (1898 and 1924) argued that cooperatives were not 
charitable institutions but they were based on the egoistic goals of their members. 
According to Pantaleoni, however, cooperative firms had a sort of exclusive 
approach: once a given size was reached old members excluded new membership of 
new workers or consumers because this would have reduced the profit and the 
control capacity of the original members.  
In more recent times, a new literature developed on the so called ‘labour-
managed firm’ (Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966; Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972 and 1974). The 
kind of firm studied in this case was called ‘Illyrian firm’. The Illyrian firm was 
represented by a group of workers who organised teams to produce a given product 
or service. This firm did not have a true internal hierarchy and was self-managed 
following a democratic principle: one man, one vote. Workers were not the owners 
of the assets of the firm but were entitled of the usufruct. 
A typical question that was studied in this literature was the problem of 
measuring individual contribution to production in a firm based on team work.  
One possible version of the Illyrian firm was the so called ‘pure-rental firm’, 
that is a firm in which workers could only rent the assets from the State (Yugoslavia 
was a socialist country) and the net surplus produced was to be distributed among 
the workers. There was no ownership right that could have been sold from one 
worker to another or to third parties. Workers had the right to hire new workers. 
While a capitalist firm had the goal of profit maximization, a self-managed firm had 
the goal to maximize workers’ per capita net surplus. Team working could arise 
monitoring problems because individual effort was difficult to observe and to verify 
and so free riding, opportunistic behaviour could be much diffused.  
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James Meade (1986 and 1989) had the idea that a direct participation of 
workers to the ownership of firms would have a positive impact on their incentive 
to work. Meade distinguished four different types of labour participation to firm 
governance: labour-managed cooperative; employee share ownership schemes 
(ESOS); profit-sharing; discriminating labour-capital partnerships. In a labour-
managed cooperative the entire capital of the firm is held by workers. This kind of 
firm is efficient if its size is limited: if the number of workers-owners is not very 
large than there is sufficient incentive and possibility to monitor each other 
contribution to the common work, if the number of workers-owners becomes very 
large there will be a free rider problem. ESOS enables workers to become owners of 
a relevant part of the capital of the firm but does not give them any control rights. 
ESOS are basically an investment fund that ensures a return to workers and give 
them additional incentives to work. Profit-sharing is a model in which workers do 
not receive shares of the firm but have only a part of their compensation that is a 
fraction of total profit of the firm itself. Workers in this case are not owners but only 
employees. Discriminating labour-capital partnership is what Meade thought to be a 
new model: two types of shares were to be issued, labour-shares and capital-shares. 
Labour-shares were to be given to workers and could not be re-sold; capital-shares 
were to be given to the investors. Workers and capital investors were receiving 
dividends. Dividends were the only kind of compensation also for workers, that did 
not have anymore a fixed wage and this should have generated very strong 
incentives.  
3.1  The corporate governance of cooperative firms          
The Illyrian approach and Meade’s partnership view were concerned with labour 
managed firms and typically assumed that historical or political reasons may 
explain the emergence of cooperative firms.  
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A different view is that derived from the property rights approach of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). In a context in which 
contracts are incomplete, and individuals have different human capital, different 
talents property rights on the assets that are necessary for production are efficiently 
allocated to the individuals who are indispensable to the production process and 
whose contribution to the firm’s surplus is maximum due to their ex ante 
investments. The individuals who hold property rights over the assets have in turn 
maximum incentives to invest in specific human capital necessary to manage the 
firm and have lower risks to be expropriated ex post by other parties. 
A cooperative firm is characterised by common ownership and it may be an 
efficient model when a specific entrepreneurial project, a specific bundle of assets 
are linked not to a single person but to a ‘key group’ of individuals (those who have 
the right talents). This ‘key group’ is made of those individuals who collectively 
have the human capital more valuable to the specific entrepreneurial project 
involved; in such a case control over the firm should be allocated to this key group 
and decisions should be taken together according to some simple rule (democratic). 
In a cooperative, following this approach, a group of workers have the opportunity 
to become entrepreneurs, giving them strong incentive to be more innovative and 
risk taker.  
A consumer cooperative can be viewed as system through which a group of 
consumer (the ‘key group’) coordinate their actions in order to gain some of the 
oligopolistic rents available in the distribution sector: the cooperative will make 
collective purchases of goods and sell them at a discount to the coop members or to 
the public at large.  
Cooperative can be consider as a way to solve some segmentation of the 
markets. Market imperfection in the credit sector may explain why it may be 
reasonable and efficient to create a credit cooperative (Hansmann, 1996). When, for 
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example, financial markets are imperfect, individuals (typically young people) 
without a credit history, new potential entrepreneurs may have difficulties to get 
loans form a bank or to issue bonds. In such a case, these individuals may establish a 
cooperative each of them subscribing a small fraction of equity capital.  
Strong fiduciary links among individuals, mutual trust may enable them to 
overcome asymmetric information problems in the credit sectors. A credit 
cooperative is fundamentally based on robust mutual trust among a group of 
individuals who belong to the same territory, share the same values, know each 
others and may monitor each others and so more easily provide financial resources 
to those who need them.  
A cooperative is thus characterised by some factors: a dispersed but strongly 
linked ownership structure; a “one head-one vote” system, regardless of the amount 
of shares a members has he is entitled of only one vote (democratic system); the use 
of a fraction of profit for mutual goals. Cooperative shares are not completely 
tradable on the market, because new subscribers are subject to approval by old 
cooperative members; in some cases some specific prerequisites are necessary in 
order to become member of a cooperative (in some cases cooperatives are open only 
to some types of members, for instance their workers, or the membership is 
geographically constrained). 
The directors of a cooperative firm have to be also shareholders or members; 
this is to ensure that those who manage the firm have clear mutual ideals. The 
manager can be chosen among the members or being hired among the professional 
manager. Usually, MCBs are managed by manager appointed among the bank 
employees, based on internal career. 
 We may distinguish between small cooperative and large ones. In the first 
case, the limited number of members ensures that each of them will be able to 
monitor the manager’s behaviour and so reduce possible opportunistic behaviour. 
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But when we are dealing with large cooperative, with thousands of members, the 
choice of having a member manager and not to hire professional managers from 
outside may be a problem. In this case, each member will have small incentives to 
monitor the manager’s behaviour and will free ride. Managers may have 
opportunities to extract private benefit of control.               
In many cases cooperative have limit to individual ownership: each member 
cannot have more than a given amount of shares. In general, the democratic voting 
system and the necessity to have an approval from old members in order to 
purchase cooperative shares create very strong obstacles to the possibility of hostile 
takeovers. An external investor who thinks that a given cooperative is poorly 
managed and that is currently undervalued cannot make a tender offer and get 
control of it.  
4. MCBs: a social financial enterprise.  
As Pantaleoni stated in 1898, “Cooperative enterprises are economic 
enterprises as organizations which tend to produce cheap goods at a lower cost than 
with other means could be done to the benefit of those who are company 
shareholders. Interest individual is the strength of which they are a manifestation. 
Alternative forms are charitable function and function Forced8.” (Mosetti and 
Santella, 2000: 3). Cooperatives can be seen as an answer to monopolistic power. The 
aggregation of members, thanks to their critical mass, can solve the market 
segmentation by creating an alternative provider of a good or of a service for specific 
segment of the market (Hansmann, 1996).  
                                                 
8  “Le imprese cooperative sono imprese economiche in quanto organizzazioni tendenti a produrre 
beni economici con un costo minore di quello che con altri mezzi si potrebbe, a vantaggio di coloro 
che dell’impresa sono soci. L’interesse individuale è la forza di cui esse sono una manifestazione. 
Forme alternative sono la funzione caritativa e la funzione coatta (consorzi di bonifica)” (Pantaleoni, 
pp.142-143). 
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The emergence of MBCs is also explained by the asymmetric information 
theory. Commercial banks tend to solve the uncertainty due to the lending 
relationship through financial guarantees and capital self owned. Monitoring and 
reputation are elements valued into a transactional lending activity. MCBs enter into 
the segment of the market usually not eligible for formal loans. As a social 
enterprise, a MCB is born to answer the unanswered request of subjects not 
profitable for the traditional enterprises. The exploitation of market interstices 
allows social enterprises to behave as a monopolist in that peculiar area, facing as 
competitors others enterprise of social nature. However, the coordination of 
cooperatives and social enterprise into second level organization reduces the 
possible competition.  
Cooperatives are intrinsically different from non for profit organization. 
While the target for this last organization is external, cooperative mainly works in 
the interest of members. Furthermore, the not for profit organizations solve 
asymmetry of information as well as cooperatives. However, when the cost for 
creation of a cooperative is higher than the interest of the principal given the limited 
goal to reach, then a non for profit organization will be settled (Mosetti and Santella, 
2000).  
Considering the “non distribution constrain” as a rule of thumb in order to 
asses the nature of a firm, it is not necessaries to search for altruistic elements in the 
objective function of the organization. Using this classification, some cooperatives, 
as MCBs, can be labeled as not for profit. However, this decision rule is too broad 
and leaves room for misspecification. MCBs fit most, if not all, of the characteristics 
that both define cooperatives and social enterprises. However, they are different 
from not for profit organization, even if MCBs do not distribute dividends because 
their principally act for members’ interests.   
 19 
As mentioned before, Italy is a country with a high concentration of 
cooperatives of different types. Two main characteristics need to be underlined: the 
propensity to create a network among cooperatives, on the one hand, and the 
consciousness of their social utility, recognized by the Constitution of the Italian 
Republic, on the other hand (Fici, 2010). Cooperative are recognized and protected 
by the Constitution under art. 45. The article states that the Republic recognizes the 
social function of cooperatives which show a mutual character and no private 
speculation purpose. In order to be acknowledged as cooperative two main 
requirements need to be matched: the mutual character and the absence of 
speculation purpose.  
MCBs are regulated by the Italian law as cooperative banks together with 
Popular Banks. Both are required to satisfy the “mainly mutual with members” 
requirements in order to be eligible for tax reduction. However, same differences 
remain. Mutual banks have focused more on the internal growth enacting the role of 
local bank and choosing as preferred segment of the market small and medium 
firms. Popular banks preferred the external growth enlarging their size through 
mergers and acquisition with non cooperative banks (Alexopulos and Goglio, 2010).  
Mutuality is the main component of the objective function for MCBs. As 
stated by Fici (2010: 8), “a cooperative, like for profit companies, is a company which 
acts in the interest of its members, and that the common interest of members may 
also be financial, even though technically non-lucrative”. MCBs can be seen as banks 
pursuing an internal interest, concerned of their members’ welfare, though a non-
lucrative aim.  
The characteristics that enable cooperative banks to successfully exploit their 
strategic market position are: 
 The proximity to clients; 
 The geographical and social homogeneity of clients; 
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 The ownership structure in which clients/members are included;  
 The peer monitoring;  
 The common ideology; 
 The mechanism for clients screening (specific economic agents, rating). 
The ownership structure with customer-owners and the managerial structure permit 
the reduction of the transaction cost and the improvement of the overall efficiency.  
4.1 The ownership structure 
 
Cooperative banks, both MCBs and Popular Banks, are owned by members.  
 Popular Banks can be labeled as “pseudo public company”, given their 
overspread and fractionated ownership (Brindelli, 2002). Their members are of four 
types: customers, employees, auditors, and investors. The control of shareholders is 
indirect. The constraint on the individual capital ownership at the 50% of the overall 
social capital avoids the realization of private benefits. The possibility of ownership 
concentration is erased9 by the democrat “one head one vote” rule. Finally, popular 
banks do not have limitations on the area of influence.  
The ownership of MCBs is in the customer-owners hands. MCBs are more 
constrained by the “mainly mutual” requirement that translates into two main rules: 
the largest part of the annual net profits has to be devolved into the reserve found, 
and a minimum of 50% of lending activity should be addressed to members. 
Members own the MCBs thanks to the shares they buy at the entry moment. The 
new Banking Law of 1992 fixes the range of price for each shares by clearing stating 
not only the minimum price, 25 €, but also the maximum, 500 €, per share. In order 
to avoid the concentration of ownership, it is not possible to buy shares for a value 
above 50.000€. Given the democratic voting rule of “one head one vote”, an hostile 
                                                 
9
 It is the possible to concentrate ownership through the acquisition by homogenous members that 
guarantees the majority of head with a previous agreement with the board. 
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take over strategy will not lead to increase power in the decision making process10. 
Members cannot even have a lucrative interest in owning more shares because 
MCBs do not distribute dividends to shareholders11. 
The different ownership structure has as consequence a different goal 
function for MCBs and Popular Banks. Popular Banks deal with heterogeneous 
holders with different, and in same case contrasting interests. They have to 
maximise a composite utility function, where the investors play a prominent role 
(Trivieri, 2005). MCBs have more homogeneous members. The utility function they 
have to maximise is target on customers-members. Actually, even in MCBs it is 
possible to underline an internal conflict. Member-borrowers and member-lenders 
have contrasting preference on the interest rate value. The borrowers ask for a low 
price of capital, while the lasts lobby for a higher interest rate on deposits.  
Looking at data, the borrowers are a subset of members that represents the 
57.7 % in 2009 of the total number of members. The fact that almost half of people 
who subscribed a membership share of MCBs are not interested in lending money 
could be justified by two elements. First, members share the ideology of the bank 
and renounce to short term benefits (higher interest rate) in order to exploit the 
possibility in the future of a preferential lending relations. The second reason is 
linked with the services provided by MCBs, which guarantees to members a 
personal relationship with the bank management. As a worker of a social enterprise, 
that decides to earn a lower salary but to have more flexible and better working 
                                                 
10
 The only reason to hold a larger number of shares is to support the cooperative bank and it is the 
signal of a strict preference for this to type of banks to survive. 
11 From art. 2514 of the Italian Civil Code, mainly mutual cooperatives cannot distribute dividends on 
the subscribed capital superior to the maximum interest of postal bonds increased by 2.5%. This limit 
regards “dividends”. Moreover, these cooperatives cannot distribute reserves to user-members and 
they shall return in case of dissolution, all their assets to the mutual founds for the promotion and the 
development of cooperation (Fici, 2010).  
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condition, so a lender chooses MCBs for a durable and more personalised 
relationship with the bank.  
However, it is always the case that a member invests in more than one bank: 
commercial banks are exploited for the lucrative activities, while MCBs become a 
coffer for the long-term. The members of MCBs can also choose it as their banks just 
because they do not have other alternatives: either those people are not eligible for a 
loan in a commercial bank, or in the surrounding area MCBs is the only available 
bank. Furthermore, the fact that members and customers can collude on the same 
people, reduces the asymmetry of information problem and, as a direct 
consequence, reduces the transaction costs. The basic idea is that the ownership of 
the firm, in the absence of specific legal provisions that limit the choice, should be 
assigned to the class of stakeholders that minimises the social transaction costs 
(Hansmann, 1996; Turati, 2004). As Angelini et al. (1998:949) stated “The special 
quality of these banks seems to stem from their ownership structure […].” MCBs can 
easily minimise social transaction cost is thanks to their ability in collect soft 
information given by their ownership structure.   
The overspread ownership results in higher cost and higher level of complexity 
of monitoring that could reduce the monitoring power of shareholders. However, 
the membership nature of the ownership structure prevents managers to fully 
exploit their position and to enact activities that result in private benefits. The threat 
of the “not balance sheet approval” has efficiently worked to avoid free monitoring 
behaviours. In the UK, one of the first consequences of the demutualisation process 
has been the emergence of professional management pursuing personal goals 
together (Davis, 2005). 
 23 
4.2 The managerial structure 
From the managerial point of view, MCBs present the traditional cooperative 
structure with a three tier system of administration and control. The main bodies 
are: the member assembly, the board of directors and the supervisory body (see 
Figure 7). The system is integrated by the arbitrors whose role is to mediate between 
the board of directors and the members for their admissibility or remove from the 
bank.  
The member assembly is in charge of appointing the directors and supervisor 
during the annual meeting. All members can take part at the assembly and vote on 
the “one head one vote” democratic principle. The directors are voted among the 
members and they are in charge of the management of the bank. All members have 
one vote and a maximum of three terms can be given to a single member. 
Democracy is a central issue in cooperatives. It permits to all members to play their 
control and decision role even if one of them plays a marginal role as shareholders.  
The board of directors should be representative of the local communities in 
which the bank is settled. They are not elected for their professional skills in the 
financial sector, but thanks to their personal linkages with the community. In 
deciding about the lending policy, the directors act as public administrators who 
have to allocate a public good. The benefits of this allocation are not strictly limited 
to the community of members but can easily result in a trickle down effect on the 
local economy. The directors and the manager exploit the soft information as 
comparative advantages, when deciding on lending. As explicitly states by the 
Banca d`Italia Supervisory Instructions, the direct knowledge of a member does not 
exclude the fact that the attention should be focused on the lending as a risky 
activity.  
The social monitoring passes through two bodies. The supervisor’s body, 
elected by the general assembly with the usual voting rule, has to control 
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compliance with the law and the statute, especially for accountability issues.  The 
arbitrators, elected by the assembly, have the main role of mediating between the 
directors and the future members. Arbitrators could not receive any remuneration 
for their activity.  
The manager is the technical figure, who translates into operative actions the 
strategic directions planned by the board. He is under the control of the board and 
the supervisors, and, even more, of the members with whom he usually has a direct 
and even personal relationship. However, due to the broad ownership of 
cooperatives, Guitiérezz (2008) argues that cooperative governance limits the control 
of members over the management. Some studies have tried to link the performance 
of the bank with the ownership structure. Akella and Greenbaum (1988) found that 
the cooperative banks increased the intermediate founds above the level of 
maximum profit and in any case above the others banks level. The incentive in 
controlling managers is minimal because there are no residual rights linked to the 
ownership. This puzzling scenario has not yet fund a clear solution.  
The manager is appointed by the board and he is often chosen among the 
employees with a longer carrier into the bank. Given the fact that the internal career 
is used as an element for appointing managers, the result is lower turnover. Lower 
turnover is positive when the bank is performing well because it guarantees 
continuity but it is harmful when the performance is ineffective because it constrains 
the board’s ability to appoint a better manager (Ferri et al., 2001).  
Even if the nature if MCBs is not to redistribute divides to members, their 
ownership and managerial structure frame them into the cooperative enterprises. As 
cooperative the linkages among members are the glue for the structure and the 
strength in a competitive market. The peculiar ownership structure avoids the free 
riding behaviour that characterised public company even when tools as the take 
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over threat are not available. The interesting question is then about the future of the 
MCBs, given the challenge rising with members increase.  
5. Italian cooperative banks in transition. 
According to economic theory, firms’ growth is beneficial because it allows the 
exploitation of scale economies. The search for economies of scale has been mainly 
the consequences of the market liberalisation in 1992. MCBs in Italy were 
traditionally small in scale and simple in structure. Members were an active part of 
the decision making process thanks to the democratic voting rule. The management 
and the boards were subordinated to the will of the general assembly.  
The new banking regulation of 1992 has had a deep impact on Italian MCBs. 
The process of mergers and acquisitions has reduced the number of MCBs, but it has 
enlarged their size to exploit some economies of scale. Furthermore, it has expanded 
the number of owners. By weakening the social requirements to be admitted as a 
member, farmers and artisans were no more the only beneficiaries of the MCBs. All 
the economic categories could join the cooperative bank and exploit the mutuality.  
As a result, the bottom floor of the MCBs has been transformed into something more 
complex, while the managerial structure has not evolved accordingly. As Birchall 
and Simmons (2004: 488) point out, “a key question for co-operative theorists and 
practitioners” is whether it is still possible for larger-scale co-operative and mutual 
businesses “to remain true to the principles on which they were originally founded”.    
A tension arises. Many authors claim that the growth of Italian MCBs can be 
explained by their ability to exploit soft information (Colle, 1998; Ferri et al., 2001; 
Girardone et al., 2004). At the same time, managers are control at lower cost because 
the direct and even personal relationship with members commits them to a non-free 
riding behaviour. However, their increasing in size, resulting from mergers and 
acquisitions and from the liberalization process, challenges these traditional 
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advantages. More dispersed ownership weakens the informal relationship between 
members and management and raises problems of asymmetries of information. The 
problem of ownership and managerial evolution is crucial for understanding the 
changes in the performance of MCBs, and their adaptation process to the new 
market context (Mosetti and Santella, 2000).  
5.1 MCBs’ Managers: still a friend? 
The collection of soft information12, gathered by face-to-face relationship between 
the borrower and the lender, is feasible when there are repeated interactions 
between the same people. The deepening of information is related with the ability of 
the two parts (manager and member-borrower) to trust each other and to collect 
more information than the usual minimal requisite level. In order to exploit the 
benefits of being a member and receive loans at better conditions, a personal 
relationship is required. Furthermore, as the number of interactions increases, the 
problem of poor verifiability arises for soft information deepens. The enlargement in 
size transforms this problem into a huge obstacle that will oblige manager to prefer 
hard information instead of the soft one, erasing MCBs advantages. The manager 
plays a fundamental role thanks to his ability in organizing the branches in order to 
be as closer as possible to the member-customer necessities.    
As a matter of fact, in the last ten years in Italy, MCBs increased their 
dimensions. The number of members per MCBs has more than doubled, moving 
                                                 
12 “Hard information is almost always recorded as numbers. Thus in finance we think of financial 
statements, the history of which payments were made on time, stock returns, and quantity output 
numbers as being hard information. Soft information is often communicated in text. It includes 
opinions, ideas, rumours, economic projections, statement of management’s future plans, and market 
commentary. The fact that hard information is quantitative means that it can easily be collected, 
stored, and transmitted electronically. A second dimension of hard information is the way in which it 
is collected. The collection method need not be personal. Instead the information can be entered into a 
form without the assistance or significant guidance from a human data collector. This has the 
advantage of expanding the geographic and time dimensions across which data can be collected” 
(Petersen, 2004: 5-6). 
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from an average of 1,051 members to the most recent value in 2009 of 2,363 (see 
Figure 8). For some regions13, like Piedmont-Valle d`Aosta-Liguria, the number of 
members per MCBs is more than 7,500. Not only the average ownership base has 
enlarged, but also their working area has expanded. The number of branches has 
increased of 1,260 units, from 2,862 in 1999 to 4,122 in 2009. Actually, the 
liberalisation allows the opening of new branches also in area not directly under the 
MCB influence. A good example is Liguria that in 2009 counts 28 MCB branches but 
no MCBs settled in the region. Soft information is recognised as an important 
element for MCBs14. Furthermore, the structure of cooperative banks has changed: 
ten years ago MCBs numbered on average of five branches with 42 employees; in 
2009 these figures have increased until ten branches with 70 employees.   
Managers acting as loan officers are crucial in the MCBs lending process. 
Officers in Italian MCBs can autonomously lend money for a maximum amount that 
averages at 114,000 Euros (see Table 7). This data is higher than the amount small 
bank’s officers are allowed to manage. The manager discretionary in lending 
decision increases with the size of the bank, as Benvenuti et al. (2010) asses in 
commenting the result of a survey conducted in 2007 among Italian banks. 
Furthermore, bank size negatively impacts on the competitive advantages smaller 
banks have with SMEs. MCBs, as well as small banks, decrease their expertise in 
assessing opaque borrowers` creditworthiness (Benvenuti et al., 2010: 13).  
Finally, the relationship between borrowers and lenders, in order to be 
affective and result in soft information collection, needs to be a long term 
                                                 
13 “Region” in this case does not refer to the administrative region, but the aggregation level used by 
Federcasse. Piedmont, Valle d`Aosta and Liguria are counted as one, as well as Lazio, Sardegna, and 
Umbria, but also Abruzzo and Molise, and Puglia and Basilicata. The Province of Trento and 
Bolzano, normally accounted for administrative purpose as one region, are in this case separated. The 
reason is related with the density of MCBs per area. In Liguria, for instance, there are no MCBs 
settled, while in Trentino the concentration is the highest.  
14 In the survey Benvenuti at al. (2010) report on, 108 over 184 MCBs mark the role of non traceable-
information as “crucial” or “very important” (see Table 6).   
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relationship (Longhofer, 2000). When the manager turn over is high the interaction 
with borrowers cannot be personal and it is mainly based on hard information. 
Quoting again Benvenuti et al. (2010) work, they underline how the turnover 
increases with the bank size. As shown in Table 7, the average stay in a MCB is of 49 
months, while it decreases at 32 months for larger and medium size banks. As 
reported through the mentioned survey for some MCBs the permanence of a 
manager can be higher than 60 months, while for larger banks it is about 36. The 
internal career assures continuity in the interaction between the appointed employee 
and customers.  
The ownership structure of MCB is enlarging, but its characteristics still 
differentiate it from a public company. The comparative advantages given by the 
strict relationship between borrowers and lenders is related with the small size of 
the bank and with its membership structure. The lack of hostile takeover threat is 
compensated by the power that every member has in changing the poorly managing 
directors. Even when the number of member in the assembly is so low that it seems 
to reduce the monitor over the board, there is no possibility for a single shareholder 
to collude with the board against the interest of the members.   
5.2 Increase in size, increase in the opportunistic behavior? 
The directors of the board decide the lending and investing strategy of the bank. 
They also are in charge of the distribution of the profit share that has to be given to 
local associations or charity purpose. In this sense, the directors act as a governor 
that has to distribute a public good. Thanks to the “one-head, one-vote” rule, there is 
no way for which a group of members can exercise some lobbying power by 
acquiring the majority of the shares. Directors have to answer to a few requirements. 
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The statute enlists the elements used as a proxy for the request moral integrity of the 
candidates. No others features15 are necessaries to be elected.     
The increase in the number of members impacts on this voting mechanism. 
Birchall and Simmons (2004: 489) underline that size becomes an issue when co-
operative organisations move toward more lose touch with their members. Like 
other co-operative organisations, MCBs are affected by the size issue: the increase in 
size reduces member mobilisation and favours free-riding behaviour that leads to 
increasing monitoring costs (Birchall and Simmons, 2004). Hansmann (1996) argues 
that the governance of cooperative banks becomes less stable as the number of 
members increases. The weakening of democratic control by the general assembly 
on management may lead to opportunistic lending policies.  
The enlarging of the membership at members others than artisans and 
farmers increases the heterogeneity in the group. The first result is an unbalance in 
the composition of the boards. It is not guaranteed that all economic industry 
working on the area will be present in the board. A good example is represented by 
farmers, for which traditionally MCBs were settled. Their number is decreasing even 
in the rural area, so their relative weight in the assembly is lower. A candidate from 
the farming industry has fewer supporters and it is less probable that it will enter in 
the board. On the contrary, the increasing sector of services has a larger voting base 
and the probability of entering the board is higher. This board composition is 
democratic in the sense that it represents the larger share of members. The point is 
that it has no room for the smaller groups to play a role in the decision process. They 
are cut off. The biased economic composition can affect the strategic choices of the 
board, which will invest more into the industry the director owns.  
                                                 
15 In order to be appointed as president a minimal experience as director in the board is necessaries.  
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The mobilisation of individuals is more difficult in larger organisations than 
in smaller groups. As Olson (1965) has underlined, individuals have less incentive to 
contribute in larger groups because the larger a group is, the lower value of a unit of 
the collective good that each member receives. Moreover, a larger group requires 
more co-ordination and higher monitoring costs. The increase in the number of 
owners reduces the incentives of each member to control the directors and manager 
effort, and to actively participate at the social life of the bank. The lack of a takeover 
threat, due to the “one head-one vote” rule, avoids the possibility for a single 
member to effectively represent a danger for the established power. The spread of 
ownership makes the individual position less important in the general assembly. 
Even the social control on the board and on the manager is reduced by the increased 
distance both geographical and personal. The result could be investment policies 
detached by the interest of the community of reference. Once again the “non 
approval of the balance sheet” threat in the general assembly together with the 
social monitor of the directors that are part of the community, seems to be sufficient 
to avoid free riding behaviour. 
5.3 More dispersed ownership and better performance: a contradiction? 
The enlargement of the number of members reduces the incentives to control the 
manager and the board given the increasing costs and the lack of personal 
motivation. The manager of the MCBs can be aware of the lack of capital market 
discipline and of the lower intensity of the social monitoring pressure. The 
predictable behaviour is driven by a preference for short-termism and a reduction in 
the efficiency. As Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out, the ownership structure 
matters. The accountability of managers to owners in a mutual enterprise may be 
greater than in a private company because each member can independently exercise 
its right to withdraw funds in case of managerial inefficiency. The efficiency in 
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mutual banks needs to account from one hand, for members interests in the 
maximisation of the social welfare, on the other hand, for the minimization of the 
spread between the borrowers and depositors spread (Altunbas et al., 2001).  
What emerges from data is that MCBs are not just enlarging in their size, but 
are also improving their economic performance. The amount of deposits in the last 
decade increases by almost 42%, 7 points less than the other banks. In the period 
2007-2008 the variation in the amount of deposits of MCBs was closer to the 
variation of other banks: MCBs increases deposits for the 10%, while the other banks 
of 11%. Assets in 2008 increase by 10% while the banking industry as a whole shows 
a positive variation of 3%. Intermediate founds rises at the same speed of the rest of 
the industry. MCBs play an important role during the crisis in financing the Italian 
economy, especially for SMEs. The amount of lending per bank increases from 2007 
to 2008 by 8.5%, accounting for the 5% in the Italian credit market; while the other 
banks increase loans only by 3% (see Table and 3). The larger number of credits has 
a counterpart the worsening of the quality of the loans. In the same period, the 
insolvability varies by 16.4 %, a point less of the variation in the remaining banking 
industry. During the crisis, co-operative banks continue to serve the needs of SMEs 
for investment capital with an increase in the share of supplied credit by 14 per cent 
points. These basic statistics give the idea that MCBs are not just increasing in the 
number of owners and in branches, but also in their impact on the economy (Draghi, 
2009).   
Here a puzzling scenario arises. Does the actual performance mean that the 
mutual cooperative system is not subjected to the usual opportunistic behaviour 
given by the weakening of the monitoring power typical of the overspread 
ownership company? Could it maybe be the case that MCBs has not yet reach the 
“critical mass”, the turning point after which mutuality and cooperation are no more 
feasible? Birchall and Simmons (2004) present the results of a study made for 
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consumer cooperative in UK. The results show that after 15,000 members there is no 
room to consider this enterprise still cooperative. If this is the case, MCBs have to 
choose if they want to enlarge their structure with the risk of loosing their 
comparative advantages and transforming their form into a commercial public bank, 
or if they prefer to exploit their relational advantages and strength their position in 
their market segments. 
6. Conclusions 
A more widely dispersed ownership structure could transform MCBs into a 
new model of enterprise closer to a ‘pseudo-public company’. Given the lack of the 
monitoring tools, managers and directors could turn to a free riding behaviour that 
maximise their utility function instead of the owners’ one.  
But the ownership structure of MCBs is a powerful antidote against these 
threats. So far the role of MCBs in the Italian banking sector is quite positive; MCBs 
are performing well and sustaining their targeting customers, namely SMEs also in 
the crisis period, even if this is associated with more risks and costs (see Table 8). 
They are still different. In this contest, the fact of being a member and not only an 
owner seems to have an impact.  
The changes in banking regulation that took place in the last 15 years, the 
increasing competition in the industry brought about several transformation in the 
governance structure of the cooperative banks in Italy. The ownership structure, the 
democratic voting rules, and other features that are clearly consistent with a small 
cooperative structure are still ensuring an efficient management. However, they 
could not be the best tools when cooperative banks will grown till the point after 
which talking about a mutual cooperative bank is meaningless. 
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The challenging question is if it could be possible to find a threshold size, 
above which the cooperative elements of mutuality and information advantages 
became meaningless.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1 - Main asset sizes 
(Thousand of Euros) 
 
  MCBs Banking Industry 
 
 
value annual var.% 2007-2008 value 
annual 
var.% 
2007-
2008 
Interbanks loans 8,342 19.5 692,526 9.2 
Total loans 113,655 12.5 1,606,301 6.1 
  - short terms 39,792 12.6 564,833 4.3 
  - medium and long term 70,469 12.3 994,149 8.0 
Securities 27,582 2.8 380,326 38.3 
          
Interbank funding 1,736 -6.0 884,787 7.3 
Deposits and bonds 130,833 10.4 1,535,962 13.0 
 -direct funding 59,561 3.8 71,305 3.8 
 -long term funding 71,271 16.5 822,912 17.0 
     in particular bonds 54,373 19.3 628,514 21.3 
Assets and reserves 17,199 9.3 276,632 9.6 
  
 
Source: Federcasse, www.federcasse.it (visited May 2010). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Flows of total deposits for MCBs 
(thousand of euros) 
 
  
Dic 2007 Dic 2008 Var. % Flows Flows` 
compositions 
Current accounts and savings deposits 5,018,388 5,302,105 5.7 283,717 53.3 
Certificate of deposits 368 275,861 -25.1 92,619 -17.4 
Bonds 4,790,803 581,994 21.5 1,029,191 193.2 
Other forms 612,712 644,815 5.2 32,103 6 
DIRECT FUNDING 10,790,383 12,042,775 11.6 1,252,392 235.1 
       
Gespa 617,895 407,490 -34.1 -210,405 -39.5 
Mutual Funds 630,643 392,890 -37.7 -237,758 -44.6 
Insurance products 155,917 133,834 -14.2 -22,083 -4.1 
Asset management 1,404,460 934,214 -33.5 -470,246 -88.3 
Assets under administration 2,696,641 2,447,141 -9.3 -249,500 -46.8 
INDIRECT FUNDING 4,101,101 3,381,355 -17.6 -719,746 -135.1 
TOTAL FUNDING 14,891,484 15,424,130 3.6 532,646 100 
        
Source: Annual Report “Rapporto Cooperazione Trentina” 2008-2009 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the Total Funding 
(Percentage) 
 
  
Dic 2007 Dic 2008 
      
Direct/indirect funding 38.0% 28.1% 
     
Asset managent/indirect funding 34.2% 27.6% 
   
        
Source: Annual Report “Rapporto Cooperazione Trentina” 2008-2009 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - The cooperative firms in Italy through census data 
 
(Units) 
 
  
Cooperative 
firms Var. % 
% on the 
total firms Workers  Var. % 
1951 10,782   0.7 137,885   
1961 12,229 13.4 0.6 192,008 39.3 
1971 10,744 -12.1 0.5 207,477 8.1 
1981 19,900 85.2 0.7 362,435 74.7 
1991 35,646 79.1 1.1 584,322 61.2 
2001 53,393 49.8 1.2 935,239 60.1 
Source: Zamagni, 2006 on ISTAT data 
 
 
 
Table 5: Workers in cooperative firms decomposed by industry 
(Units) 
 
  1971 1981 1991 2001 
Fishing and Agriculture 32,660 33,795 27,948 36,917 
Manufacture 44,213 90,335 112,762 85,815 
Building 32,168 58,811 61,654 57,796 
Trade 25,386 44,078 83,611 74,047 
Other services 73,050 135,396 270,837 531,517 
Social enterprises   27,510 149,147 
Total  207,477 362,435 584,322 935,239 
Annual variation %  74.69 61.22 60.06 
          
Source: Zamagni, 2006 on ITAT data 
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Table 6 - Bank size, loan pricing and lending technology 
(Units) 
 
  
Loan officers allowed 
to lower interest rate 
by more than 25 b.p. 
Importance of  
"soft information" 
Credit scoring 
crucial in lending 
decision 
  yes no yes no yes no 
Large and medium-sized banks 2 12 20 17 30 6 
Small banks in banking groups 3 38 38 36 32 19 
Stand-alone small banks 0 14 10 10 8 9 
Cooperative banks 12 91 108 76 45 41 
Total 17 155 176 139 115 75 
              
The size classification given by the Bank of Italy defines small banks those which have a total assets of less than 7 
billion Euros. 
Soft information is given by a dummy variable that take value 1 when the usage of non-traceable information is 
defined “crucial” or “very important”. 
Credit scoring is a variable with value 1 if the bank uses credit scoring and/or internal rating system for SME 
finance. 
Source: Benvenuti et al., 2010:17 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 - Bank size, delegation and loan officer turnover 
(thousand of euros) 
 
  
Maximum amount of money Loan Officers 
are allowed to lend autonomously Months Loan Officer stay in a branch 
  mean p25 p50 p75 Mean p25 p50 p75 
Large and medium-sized banks 458 108 200 380 32 26 32 36 
Small banks in banking groups 211 80 125 250 40 30 36 48 
Stand-alone small banks 112 44 90 150 48 36 40 60 
Cooperative banks 114 10 30 100 49 36 48 60 
Total 176 18 71 150 45 33 38 60 
                  
The size classification given by the Bank of Italy defines small banks those which have a total assets of less than 7 billion 
euros. 
Source: Benventuti et al., 2010:17 
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Table 8 – Market shares of Italian MCBs  
(in percentage) 
 
  2006 2007 2008 
Loans 6.6% 6.8% 8.0%     
    to artisans 21.6% 
    to minor firms 16.1% 
    to producing household 16.3% 
    to consuming household 9.0% 
    to NGOs 10.6% 
        others 6.3% 
Deposits 8.4% 8.5% 8.6%     
 
 
Source: Federcasse, www.federcasse.it (visited May 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Mergers and Acquisitions of MBCs after the Liberalisation 
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Source: Bank of Italy – Annual Reports 
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Figure 2 - Distribution of MCBs branches (2009) 
 
Source: Bank of Italy – on line statistics 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Density of MCBs branches per region (2009) 
 
Source: Bank of Italy – on line statistics 
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Figure 4 - MCBs: Compositions of the Total Funding in December 2008 
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Source: Annual Report “Rapporto Cooperazione Trentina” 2008-2009 
Figure 5 - MCBs: Composition of Liabilities in 2008 
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Source: Federcasse, www.federcasse.it (visited May 2010). 
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Figure 6 - Other banks: Composition of Liabilities in 2008 
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Source: Federcasse, www.federcasse.it (visited May 2010). 
 
 
Figure 7 - MCBs Managerial Structure 
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Figure 8 - Changes in MCBs Members quantity 
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